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THE INTEGRATION OF THE ADA AND THE
PROBLEM OF DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATON
Melinda Bird*
Thank you for being here. I'm going to talk about Title II of the
ADA 1 and as I was getting ready yesterday for this talk, I dug out of
my files some materials from a seminar Loyola did ten years ago on
disability law. There was a great article by Michael Perlin and a
wonderful article by Jim Preis and Jan Costello on the constitutional
right to treatment for mentally disabled persons in our community.
In fact, they should probably be the ones giving this talk.
I am going to talk about state statutes as a way to get around the
problem of de-institutionalization that occurred in the 1980s, and the
problem of de-institutionalization as it manifests itself in the 1990s.
It is both the problem of people in institutions who want to be in the
community and cannot because there are not enough community
mental health services to support them, and also the problem of de-
institutionalization. To some extent, what we saw in the 1970s and
1980s was big state hospitals and institutions closing down, but
our problem is the revolving door. People are continually re-
institutionalized and then discharged with basically nothing. One
of the paradigms that we're looking at-and I'm going to talk about
it at the end when I talk about the litigation that's ongoing right
now-is a phenomenon that I've seen for ten years. Most people
who are involuntarily committed because they are a danger to self or
others, or gravely disabled, are held in a state hospital in an acute
psychiatric ward. Some people are kept for days or weeks and then
are discharged with a week's worth of psychotropic meds, the phone
number for the county mental health agency, and sometimes the
number for a shelter. When they call the shelter, it is full. And, when
* Melinda Bird is the managing attorney of the Southern California office
of Protection and Advocacy, Inc. Prior to this, she worked for 16 years at West-
ern Center on Law and Poverty, the state legal services back-up center. She has
practiced extensively in state and federal court on class action public benefit
cases and appeals.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327.
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they call the counselor, mental health agency, or the center, the first
appointment they can get is weeks after their medication runs out.
We have seen that for so many years, we don't even flinch. It just
happens all the time. We call it discharge to the streets. It happens
to people that are housed as well as homeless. And it's so foolish
that there's got to be a way to tackle it.
What Jim and Jan were struggling for in their article in 1987
were some theories that would help us tackle it, but what we didn't
have then was the Americans with Disabilities Act. And the ADA
has given us, in Title II, a wonderful federal statutory claim that is
markedly different from the constitutional due process and statutory
claims that we were wrestling with in the 1980s.2 The provision that I
am going to talk about is what we call the "integration mandate."3 It
is part of the regulations that the ADA requires and I will read it to
you. Let me first back up and say that the ADA itself says, in Title
II, that no qualified person with a disability-"shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by such an institute."4 So that's what
the statute says.
The regulations are great. The regulations recognize that dis-
crimination can be manifested by segregation, by excluding people
and not integrating them into the community.5 So the regulations go
further and say, "a public entity shall administer services, programs
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the indi-
vidual needs of qualified handicapped persons."6 We call that the in-
tegration mandate. If you're going to provide services, you have to
do it in the most integrated setting appropriate. When I think about
it conceptually, I think of it like an adverb. It's not a substantive
right. Rather, it attaches to a right and tells the entity how it is going
to do what it is doing anyway. So, many of the cases say, and I think
it's correct, that this integration mandate doesn't create a right to
services or treatment, but it attaches to benefit programs that are al-
ready there and that the states are already doing. Like an adverb-it
tells them how they have to do this program.
The lead case interpreting the integration mandate appears in
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-34 (1997).
3. Integration Mandate, 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
5. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(4)(i).
6. Id. § 41.51(d).
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your materials. It is called Helen L. v. DiDario' The cite is there; it
is a Third Circuit decision from 1994. What happened in Helen L.?
The plaintiff was a woman in a nursing home who was ready for dis-
charge but who could not go home because there were no home-care,
attendant-care services for her. Her state, Pennsylvania, like many
other states, didn't have a home-care or attendant-care program that
was available to everybody. Attendant-care programs are funded
through the Medicaid statute under the federal Medicaid program. I
am going to talk about Medicaid as one of the most important
state/federal programs that we're working with now for people with-
mental disabilities.
Pennsylvania did not want to spend the money to provide atten-
dant-care to everybody who needed it. Instead, they had what's
called a "waiver" where they could provide some attendant-care, but
they could cap their expenses, so they could have a waiting list for
people to get attendant care. Idell-the person who ended up being
the actual plaintiff who is discussed in the Third Circuit case-
couldn't get attendant-care services. Instead, she was getting Medi-
caid funding to stay in the nursing home. The bottom line is if the
states can spend money-Medicaid dollars-to keep her in the nurs-
ing home, it has to spend those Medicaid dollars "in the most inte-
grated setting appropriate" to Idell S.'s needs. The state had stipu-
lated that she could live in a community with attendant-care. Now
the state's protest was sort of feeble. They said, "We're not set up to
do this and we don't have a statute." The court said: "Forget it!
You are spending more money on the nursing home services than
you would on the attendant-care services. Retool your program to
deliver the services that Idell needs."
Even more fundamentally, there is language in Helen L. that
talks about that linkage between segregation and discrimination and
integration. I will read it to you: "In enacting the ADA, Congress
found that, '[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and.., such forms of discrimination...
continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.' Congress
concluded that '[i]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including... segregation."' 8 Again,
this is back to Michael's keynote at the very beginning, that segrega-
tion of people with disabilities keeps them locked away in an institu-
7. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
8. Id- at 332 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)).
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tion. It is part of the pervasive discrimination that the ADA was in-
tended to address.
Many people are currently using the integration mandate in liti-
gation. Basically, what we are trying to do is look at situations where
people are either in locked institutions and not given the option for
services in the community, or they're in the community with nothing.
The only place they can get care is when they get into an acute epi-
sode. There are relatively few reported decisions on this, but there is
a group of a couple dozen people doing a lot of these integration
mandate cases. I brought a notebook of pleadings from the Disabil-
ity Law Project in Pennsylvania as an example of how people across
the country are trying to network. Elaine Shane and Mark Murphy
of the Disability Law Project put this great packet together, and they
even included a disk with all of their pleadings. And so, there is case
after case that they've been bringing to get people out of locked fa-
cilities and into the communities with services that will support them.
In most of these cases, the community services are rationed for what-
ever reason. It's usually budgetary, but the courts have been wonder-
ful about rejecting budgetary justifications, if you can get over the
procedural hurdles to actually get a ruling on the merits.
There is another good research tool that I rely on a lot, and that
is a docket that is issued every couple of months by a group called
NAPAS, the National Association of the Protection and Advocacy
Systems. They do a docket of significant integration and institutional
conditions cases. It's a compendium of what people are litigating all
over the country and there are probably thirty integration mandate
cases going in various parts of the nation. And I'll just back up and
say here that every state has a protection and advocacy program.
Some of them are more aggressive than others. Some of them are lo-
cated in the Governor's office. My program, the California Protec-
tion and Advocacy Program, is independent and actually a strong
program as they go nationwide.
Before I start talking about what we're actually doing right now,
let me say that both in Helen L. and in another case I wanted to
mention, the court has carefully distinguished what it was doing from
de-institutionalization cases. And they did it in a way that's slightly
defensive. It's okay with me because the de-institutionalization case
law tended to be so disastrous for us. So in Helen L., for example,
the court said this is not de-institutionalization. The court said that
de-institutionalization involves massive changes in the state's pro-
gram. It is not required absent a clear statutory command. They are
PROBLEM OF DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION
saying, instead, these are services the state already chose to provide,
and we're just telling you if you're going to spend this money you
have to spend it in an integrated setting so we are not requiring you
to create whole new programs.
The other case I wanted to mention to you is also illustrative of
how the courts are saying, "We're not doing de-institutionalization
stuff; we're doing integration mandate stuff that's okay." This is a
case called Martin v. Voinovich.9 It's a case which takes place in Ohio
in 1993. Martin is very interesting because like Helen L. it deals with
the Medicaid program." The plaintiffs brought due process de-
institutionalization claims saying there's a right to treatment in a less
restrictive setting, as well as integration mandate claims. They lost
the due process claims but they won under the integration mandate
claims." So, Martin analyzes in a very traditional, non-progressive
way, the constitutional due process claims but then rules for plaintiffs
strongly on the ADA integration mandate claims.'
Let me talk about how we're taking this wonderful opportunity
in the integration mandate and using it in California. There are ac-
tually five cases I'm going to talk about. One is a case that we filed in
March 1996 called Hale v. Belshg. Hale was brought on behalf of a
class of people in locked psychiatric nursing homes. We've got 5000
people in this state in these settings. Our contention was that the
state illegally limits community mental health services, the rehabili-
tative mental health services available to people in the community
and funded through the Medicaid program. Because these are arbi-
trarily limited, people have to stay in these locked psychiatric nursing
homes who are ready to go into the community. We argued Helen L.
We presented strong claims that this is a violation of the ADA deny-
ing the state's motion to dismiss. We got a very good decision from
the federal district court in San Francisco on the state's motion to
dismiss finding, yes, there is a revolving door.
At that point, the state raised a procedural challenge that we're
seeing "all over the country in response to the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act. Advocates are raising these ADA Title II claims
against state entities and we're doing them in federal court. The
Eleventh Amendment says the states are immune from suit in federal
9. 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
10. See id. at 1180.
11. See id. at 1192.
12. See id.
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court unless there is an abrogation of state immunity.1 3 Congress
specifically abrogated state immunity from suit in federal court under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, but the states are taking a pretty
steep position that Congress's abrogation of state immunity in the
ADA is unconstitutional. Why? Because the integration mandate,
among other things, requires affirmative acts that go beyond the
power of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress can't authorize
suits for relief that exceed what is directly available in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The good news is that after the state appealed, we won
on this issue in the Ninth Circuit. But by the time we got back to the
district court, we'd gotten everybody who was our named plaintiff out
of the locked nursing homes because we couldn't just leave them
there while we're off in the Ninth Circuit. So we were effectively
mooted.
Even though the Hale case is over, I think we focused on the
right group of folks-residents of psychiatric nursing homes. They
were folks who were the most in need. These psychiatric nursing
homes, they're horrible. They're commercial enterprises; they actu-
ally recruit patients. They replaced the big state mental hospitals,
and they're a little bit better, but not much. The problem is that
when we came in with our experts to do psychological assessments,
they said this person really needs to be in the community. The first
impulse of the nursing home is, "Fine! We'll discharge her!" So our
representation triggered a discharge, and it was very hard to hold the
class together with the focus on the people in the locked nursing fa-
cilities.
We dismissed the Hale case voluntarily without prejudice in Oc-
tober. We've actually now asked the Ninth Circuit to publish its good
decision on the Eleventh Amendment and the ADA. We argued
Hale with two companion cases on the application of the ADA to
state prisons, Clark14 and Armstrong.5 There are petitions for certio-
rari on those two cases. And I think eventually this question of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of states under the ADA will finally
become a moot point; but for a while, at least, it's really time that is
impeding federal litigation. After we dismissed the federal case, we're
continuing with one of our main plaintiffs, Mr. Hale, actually, in a state
court action in San Francisco. It's an individual action trying to get
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
14. See Clark v. California, No. C96-1486, 1996 WL 628221 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1,
1996).
15. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997).
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him the community mental health services that he needs. So, in a
small context we're still working on that.
The issues in Mr. Hale's individual case are also interesting be-
cause it illustrates another subtle level of discrimination that people
of psychiatric disabilities experience, and that is the idea that you
have to be cured, as opposed to making accomodations to your be-
havior. For people with developmental disabilities, the idea of be-
havior and behavior management is very common. We don't expect
people with developmental disabilities to "get better" and become
able to do things just fine on their own. With people with psychiatric
disabilities, there's an expectation they should get better. In institu-
tions, the attitude is that we're not going to let them out until they get
better. With Mr. Hale, because he's been institutionalized so long, he
has a lot of difficult behaviors. We want a behaviorist to come in and
work with him and create a structure that will support him the way
you would support someone with developmental disabilities. What
you do is work with his impairments as opposed to expecting him to
overcome them on his own. And it is amazing how, in the psychiatric
disability community, there's resistance to behaviorists coming in and
working with people like Mr. Hale about a home plan that would en-
able him to deal with things like inappropriate urination or poor
eating habits. It's literally those two things that are keeping this man
in a psychiatric nursing facility. If he were developmentally disabled,
people would work with him around that, as opposed to saying,
"You're going to be locked up until you stop peeing in public." Be-
cause he's been institutionalized for twenty-five years and can't help
these behaviors, the way they're approaching it is simply punitive. So
that's a second case that we're doing for an individual client.
There are two other integration mandate cases that we're work-
ing on. One is what we call "the discharge to the streets" case. In-
stead of focusing on, as I said before, people in a locked facility,
we're working with people who have been involuntarily committed
and then discharged with nothing. Many of these are people who are
homeless in the community. The only way they're going to get serv-
ices is when they have another crisis and they are recommitted. Their
prospects of getting services that are even vaguely equal in terms of
cost, if they're in the community, is nil. In other words, we'll spend
$1000 a day or $1000 a week to keep them in a locked facility, but we
won't spend one cent when they're in the community.
So, the integration mandate and the Medicaid statute are the
sort of engines that will drive this case. Most all of the people that
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we're working with are, in fact, eligible for the Medicaid program and
covered under our state Medicaid plan. We have an excellent pack-
age of rehabilitative mental health services that includes case man-
agement-what we call "brokerage services"-that can link you up
with housing and job training, but very few people get it because it's
rationed. There is a series of really strong claims to these benefits
based on the Medicaid Act. One of them is that services have to be
provided with reasonable promptness. In many of the county mental
health clinics, there are waiting lists. So, if you have a crisis, that's
fine. We'll give you an appointment in two weeks. You're running
out of medication, the next appointment for medication management
is December. Failing to provide services with reasonable promptness
for someone for whom this treatment is medically necessary, and
necessary now, is a violation of federal law. Budget limitations are
not availing, both when you're looking at Medicaid law and when
you're looking at the integration mandate, because the truth is, if you
have a breakdown or a psychotic episode, they'll put you in a psych
unit in an acute care hospital and give you your meds then. So, they
will provide services but not in an integrated setting as an option.
One of the things that makes the new approach that we're taking
easier, I believe, is that we're working with people who the state will
agree, at this point, don't need to be institutionalized. So we won't
have a factual dispute as we did in the first case about whether people
are able to be in the community. They've been discharged. Some-
body's already said they can be in the community. They just won't
give them the services to remain there.
There are two other cases that we're working on that involve
children. A part of the Medicaid program is called EPSDT, Early
Periodic Screening Detection and Treatment. For some of you, your
eyes may glaze like they did when I was talking about the Eleventh
Amendment, but I'll just tell you a bit about the Medicaid program.
Under the Medicaid program, each state has the ability to pick and
choose the package of services and optional benefits that it provides
to adults. Benefits that you think are pretty basic, like medication,
are optional. They certainly don't have to provide rehabilitative
mental health services or home attendant-care-those are all op-
tional. So states can pick and choose for grown-ups. But for chil-
dren, who are defined as people under age twenty-one, the state must
provide all services that are medically necessary, if these services
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could be covered under Medicaid any place in this country." So my
reading of it is if, in any place in the United States or its territories,
there is a service that is reimbursed by Medicaid, then it's mine.
When we request services for children, we attach copies of the Medi-
caid plans from states that have good benefit packages and say,
"Look! In Pennsylvania you're funding crisis intervention where you
have a one-on-one para-professional aid who comes in with a child
and stays in the home as a one-on-one. You won't do that here, but
you have to because that's what's medically necessary for this child."
EPSDT is a very, very powerful mandate for treatment.
Advocates in California filed an EPSDT case several years ago,
and have gotten a lot of services implemented, but the part that the
state has never really implemented is mental health services. Their
whole delivery system-who you ask for benefits and how you know
what you can get-is all extremely vague. But for children with men-
tal health needs, the EPSDT program says you get whatever the child
needs if it's medically necessary. Think of this in conjunction with
the integration mandate. What you have is-for a child in an institu-
tion or a child locked up in a state hospital-the creation of the right
to any service which will enable that child to be in the community. If
you spend one dollar of Medicaid money on this child, then you've
got to provide all the services that the child needs in the most inte-
grated setting, which is going to be in the community.
The state has had a number of units at the state hospitals for
children. These are about as restrictive as placements can get for a
kid. The state has been consolidating these hospital units to the point
where shortly, as of January 1, 1998, there will be only one state hos-
pital placement for children with psychiatric disabilities-at Metro-
politan State Hospital here in Norwalk. Metropolitan subjects these
children to terrible conditions. Those of you from L.A. may have
seen last week in the Los Angeles Times a good article that they did.
Metro hospital-I have no idea why they were so stupid-but they let
the Los Angeles Times reporter come in and take a black and white
photo of the bare tables with the leather straps where they strap
these children down when they impose restraint and seclusion. It
looks like something out of the middle ages. So there are eighty chil-
dren on those units at Metropolitan and the conditions are really ter-
rible.
We believe that through the EPSDT program and the integra-
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)(r) (1997).
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tion mandate there is no reason on God's earth that any child should
be on that unit. If you think about it with reference to a child with
physical disabilities such as a child who is a complete quadriplegic, we
think nothing of giving that child one-on-one aid in school and at
home, and we'll pay for it through Medicaid without flinching be-
cause that child can't carry out his or her activities of daily living
without assistance. These children with psychiatric disabilities are
similar in some ways in that they also cannot do activities of daily
living on their own. And when they do, they have crises, or they de-
compensate, or they don't know how to modify their behavior. They
aren't successful on their own in the community. But our response-
rather than to say let's give them the one-on-one aid who can model
behavior and be a mentor for them and help them calm down in a
crisis and then help them understand it-is to lock them up. In the
past we also locked up children who were quadriplegic, but we
stopped doing that. Part of this change in thinking is saying that if
we're willing to deliver enough services to the children in the com-
munity, there's no reason to keep them locked up.
There are now thirteen children at the other remaining state
hospital, Napa State Hospital in Northern California, who are going
to be transferred down to Metropolitan State Hospital. Nine of these
children are children from Northern California. So just before
Thanksgiving and Christmas they're going to be transferred five hun-
dred miles away from their families down to Metropolitan State
Hospital, where there are as many as six incidents of restraint and
seclusion per day on the children's wards. It's really horrible that
they're trying to move the children that far away. What we've told
the state is, "You cannot move these children." Under the EPSDT
program, you have to put these children in the most integrated set-
ting, and that's someplace in the community. Many of these kids
have left group homes. They bombed out of group homes because
they had behaviors that couldn't be managed. But the question is, if
you went to the group home and said "I'll give you a one-on-one to
stay with little Susan," or whoever, would the group home have kept
the child? And I'll bet you the answer would be yes. If you offered
the placements that they failed in more services and support, they
probably could have been successful. We will have the opportunity, I
suspect, next week to see how these theories work in action when we
seek a temporary restraining order to stop the transfer of these chil-
dren from Napa to Metropolitan.
Another issue we are looking at is the fact that, as horrible as
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Metropolitan Hospital is, there's a waiting list to get in. There are
children who are in temporary holding facilities with the dependency
or the juvenile court. So the other suit we'll be working on is to rem-
edy the situation, and the class will be the children on the waiting list
to go to Metropolitan. Our standard is before you spend $100,000 a
year to lock this child up in a state hospital, look at what else you can
buy with that money in the community. And until you can show us
that you negated every possibility-and my standard is up to $100,000
per year-you can't put that kid in the facility. We have other kinds
of claims about discharge planning, pre-admission, screening, and
other sorts of planning claims that are involved when you institu-
tionalize somebody. But the guts of the case will be the integration
mandate and EPSDT and the idea that if you're going to spend one
dollar of Medicaid money you have to spend it in the most integrated
setting, which is in the community.
I was very excited at the Colloquium because we're obviously up
to our eyeballs in these lawsuits. So, it's exciting. Thank you.
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